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Mean-Field Transmission Power Control in
Dense Networks
Part II - Social Welfare Evaluation
Yuchi Wu, Junfeng Wu, Minyi Huang, and Ling Shi
Abstract— We consider uplink power control in wireless
communication when massive users compete over the
channel resources. In Part I [1], we have formulated massive
transmission power control contest in a mean-field game
framework. In this part, our goal is to investigate whether
the power-domain non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA)
protocol can regulate the non-cooperative channel access
behaviors, i.e., steering the competition among the non-
cooperative users in a direction with improved efficiency
and fairness. It is compared with the CDMA protocol, which
drives each user to fiercely compete against the popula-
tion, hence the efficiency of channel usage is sacrificed.
The existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium strategy
under CDMA and NOMA have already been characterized
in Part I. In this paper, we adopt the social welfare of the
population as the performance metric, which is defined as
the expectation of utility over the distribution of different
types of channel users. It is shown that under the corre-
sponding equilibrium strategies, NOMA outperforms CDMA
in the social welfare achieved, which is illustrated through
simulation with different unit price for power consumption.
Moreover, it can be observed from numerical results that
NOMA can improve the fairness of the achieved data rates
among different users.
Index Terms— Mean-field game, successive interference
cancellation, CDMA, NOMA, 5G.
I. INTRODUCTION
As overviewed in Part I [1], transmission power control
has been considered in wireless communication and networked
control system. Recent advances in the fifth-generation (5G)
communication network [2] lead to a resurgence of interest
in transmission power allocation problems. Following this
trend, our work aims at investigating the patterns of the power
allocation game in presence of a large number of users when
NOMA, as one of the main features of the 5G network, is
adopted as the communication protocol.
To appropriately model the interactive behaviors among a
large number of users, a mean-field game model [3], [4] is
adopted for characterizing the transmission power contest. In
Part I [1], we have characterized the equilibrium strategies
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under CDMA and NOMA. A direct question emerges that
whether NOMA, which regulates the power contest among
massive players through interference cancellation, is capa-
ble of outperforming CDMA in terms of the social welfare
achieved.
Different from the cases with a centralized decision maker,
the performance comparison in a game-theoretic model is
intractable due to the decentralized information pattern as
well as the non-cooperative nature of the players. In order to
conveniently conduct comparisons between the performance
achieved under different games, it is necessary to build a
bridge between games and optimization problems. Analyses
in this direction are closely related to the price of anarchy
(PoA), which discusses the degradation of the efficiency of
the system when the players are non-cooperative compared to
the centralized case.
The connection between the equilibria of a game and the
optimal solution to an optimization problem, especially the
PoA, has been addressed frequently in the literature. A seminal
study has been carried out by Dubey [5], where the theoretical
foundation is laid for the inefficiency of the equilibria in
a game with finite players. Since then, works have been
focusing on the efficiency of selfish routing. Roughgarden
and Tardos [6] considered a routing game over a congested
network, and quantified the efficiency degradation for linear
latency functions. Then, Mavronicolas and Spirakis [7] in-
vestigated PoA of routing game with a simple topology of
parallel links, both uniform and non-uniform link capacities
are considered. Roughgarden [8] have shown that the PoA
of a routing game in presence of network congestion is
independent of the network topology. Moreover, Koutsoupias
and Papadimitriou [9] characterized the upper and lower bound
of PoA when agents share a common resource. An application
of PoA is discussed by Deori et al. [10], where the authors
considered the electric vehicle charging game.
With the development of mean-field decision models, anal-
ysis on the connections between the mean-field equilibria and
the social optimality has been carried out for various problems.
Huang et al. [11] considered an LQG control problem in the
mean-field setup, where the team optimal solution based on
the decentralized information structure is shown to achieve
social optimal asymptotically. Later, both Nourian et al. [12]
considered mean-field games for synchronization of a large
number of oscillators, and characterized the efficiency loss
at the game equilibrium. In order to perform computation
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and analysis on mean-field equilibrium more conveniently, Li
et al. [13] proposed an equivalent formulation of a class of
mean-field games as optimization problems, in which the LQG
mean-field game is an example. For modeling the evolution
of the game equilibria when the number of players in a
game approaches infinity, Lacker and Ramanan [14] adopted
a probabilistic model to characterize the speed for some rare
equilibria to vanish. To further generalize the results about the
PoA of a mean-field stochastic dynamic game, Cardaliaguet
and Rainer [15] characterized the upper bound and the lower
bound of the efficiency loss corresponding to the mean-field
equilibria for a general cost function. Similarly, Carmona et
al. [16] considered the PoA for the linear quadratic extended
type of mean-field games.
In this paper, we plan to carry out the social welfare compar-
ison under the equilibrium strategies for uplink transmission
under CDMA and NOMA protocols respectively. Similar to
aforementioned works in PoA, this paper also exploits the
connection between non-cooperative games and social welfare
optimization problems for performance comparison. The main
challenges are listed as follows.
(1) A unified framework needs to be developed such that the
shift of equilibria as we switch from CDMA to NOMA
protocol can be characterized, and the corresponding
social welfare achieved can be compared;
(2) Previous results [17]–[21] on performance comparison
between NOMA and orthogonal multiple access (OMA)
mainly deal with a centralized decision model. It is chal-
lenging to extend this comparison to a non-cooperative
setup due to the coupling among the actions chosen by
different users.
As an answer to address these challenges, we have the
following contributions in this work:
(1) In order to present the mean-field games under a uni-
fied framework, we propose functional optimization
problems (Problem 3 and Problem 4) for compari-
son purposes rather than calculation, where CDMA and
NOMA communication protocols are posed as different
constraints. Such an optimization perspective has also
been adopted by Chen et al. [20], while our contribu-
tion lies in the extension to non-cooperative setup and
generalization to the analysis in functional spaces;
(2) We have shown the coincidence between the mean-field
equilibria and the optimal solution to the optimization
problems (Theorem 3);
(3) As a bridge, the optimization perspective simplifies the
social welfare comparison between game equilibria. And
differ from previous works, we have theoretically char-
acterized the social welfare enhancement of NOMA in
comparison to CDMA (as a representative of OMA) in
a non-cooperative formulation (Theorem 4).
The remainder of Part II is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, some notations and key results in Part I [1] have been
reviewed. In Section III, we transform the mean-field uplink
communication games under CDMA and NOMA protocols as
their equivalent models in the form of optimization problems.
The main results on the equilibrium social welfare comparison
is presented in this section as well. Then, in Section IV, we
give some detailed results on the individual behaviors at the
equilibrium. To illustrate the social welfare comparison results,
we present the numerical simulations in Section V. Finally, we
draw the conclusions in Section VI.
Notations:
We denote the set of non-negative numbers as R+ and
the set of positive numbers as R++. The set of non-negative
integers is denoted as N+. The standard unit vector in
the direction of the i-th dimension is denoted as ei =
(0, 0, . . . , 1︸︷︷︸
i−th
, . . . , 0) ∈ RN . For any Lebesgue measurable
set A ⊂ R, denote its Lebesgue measure as λ(A). And
the abbreviation “a.e.” is adopted for “almost everywhere”.
The space of all F-valued measurable function on (X,B(X))
is denoted as MF(X), where B(X) is the Borel σ-algebra
of X . And for any l ≤ u, we define a truncation operator as
[x]ul := min{u, max{l, x}} for any x ∈ R. The modulus of
a complex number z = x + iy ∈ C is ‖z‖ :=
√
x2 + y2,
where x, y ∈ R.
II. REVISITING THE MEAN-FIELD GAME MODEL AND THE
EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY
In Part I [1], we have proposed a mean-field game
model G = (M,A, u) for the competition among a large
number of uplink channel users, in which the users transmit
over the shared Gaussian channel through proper power allo-
cation, and each channel user interacts with the population in
a non-cooperative manner. As formulated in Part I [1], spread
spectrum technique is applied under both CDMA and NOMA.
Each of the N uplink users sharing the communication channel
is assigned a unique signature sequence with length ns so
that the transmitted signal can be spreaded over different sub-
carriers (i.e., code chips). As described by [22], the squared
correlation between the signature sequences sk and sj of
users k and j (k 6= j) can be expressed as βk,j = (s′ksj)2 ≈
1
ns
= αN . Hence, the parameter α :=
N
ns
. And in order for each
user to be assigned a distinct signature sequence for spectrum
spreading, there is 0 < α ≤ 1.
Now we recall the details on the components of the mean-
field game G as follows.
(1) The set of players is denoted as M ⊂ R. If we pick
an arbitrary user i in the population and denote its uplink
channel gain as hi ∈ C, its user identity will be expressed
as θi := ‖hi‖2 ∈ M . According to Assumption 2 in
Part I [1], we assume M 6= ∅ and 0 /∈ M to avoid
triviality and singularity. The probability density function
of the user identity is expressed as f(x) > 0, x ∈ M ,
and it has a finite first order moment (i.e.,
∫
R xf(x)dx <∞) according to Assumption 1 in Part I [1]. For M ⊂
R++, a measure space is defined as (M,B(M), λ) based
on the Lebesgue measure λ. Now we define a weighted
measure ν as follows.
ν(A) :=
∫
A
w(x)dλ(x), ∀A ∈ B(M). (1)
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The weight function w : M → [0,∞) in the definition
of the measure ν is introduced as
w(x) := xf(x), x ∈M.
Consequently, a new measure space (M,B(M), ν) is
generated.;
(2) The feasible set of transmission power levels is defined
as E = [Emin, Emax], where 0 ≤ Emin < Emax < ∞.
And the power allocation strategy is a function p :M →
E . Then, we define the set of feasible strategies as A :=
{p : (p : M → R) & (p is ν − a.e. E-valued)}, where p
is a Lebesgue measurable function.
(3) For a type of players θi ∈ M , their utility function
is denoted as u(ai, p, θi). Specifically, the expression
of the utility is given by u(ai, p, θi) = log2(1 + θi ·
SINR(p, θi))− βai, where ai is the power level chosen
by users with identity θi, the constant β > 0 denotes
the unit price for power consumption and the opponents’
strategy is p ∈ A. The term SINR(p, θi) is the signal-to-
interference-plus-noise ratio of user θi’s signal received
by the base station. According to Part I [1], it is expressed
as SINR(p, θi) := aiαE[p(θj)θj ]+N0 , ∀θi ∈ M when
CDMA is adopted, and it is expressed as SINR(p, θi) :=
ai
αE[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}]+N0
, ∀θi ∈ M when NOMA is em-
ployed.
And the definition for a projection operator is recalled as
follows.
Definition 1: For any given closed convex set X ⊂ R,
define an orthogonal projection operator PX : R → X such
that
PX(x) := argmin
z∈X
|z − x|, ∀x ∈ R. (2)
To characterize the equilibrium behaviors of the massive
players under CDMA and NOMA protocols, we have es-
tablished the existence and the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium strategy profile in Part I, together with some properties
regarding continuity and monotonicity of the transmission
power allocation strategy with respect to the identities of
users θi ∈ M .
Before presenting the main results for equilibrium social
welfare comparison in Part II, it is necessary to restate the
main theorems in Part I. First of all, we revisit the definition
of the mean-field equilibrium and the best response operator.
Definition 2 (Mean-field equilibrium): A strategy profile
p∗ ∈ A is a mean-field equilibrium of a game with an infinite
number of players if for any θi ∈M , we have
u(p∗(θi), p∗, θi) ≥ u(ai, p∗, θi), ∀ ai ∈ E . (3)
For the static mean-field game G, we define the best
response of user θi ∈M in presence of the opponents’ strategy
p ∈ A as a set-valued mapping BR :M ×A → 2E . For each
θi ∈M ,
BR(θi, p) :=
{
a∗i ∈ E : u(a∗i , p, θi) ≥ u(ai, p, θi), ∀ai ∈ E
}
.
(4)
Hence, a strategy p∗ ∈ A is a mean-field equilibrium if and
only if for any θi ∈M , there is p∗(θi) ∈ BR(θi, p∗).
Now, some definitions in Part I [1] are revisited, where two
operators are defined based on the measure ν defined in (1).
Definition 3: For any Lebesgue measurable function g :
M → R, we introduce
‖g‖ν1 :=
∫
x∈M
|g(x)|dν(x) =
∫
x∈M
|g(x)|w(x)dλ(x). (5)
Definition 4: For a bounded Lebesgue measurable function
f : M → R, we define its essential supremum based on the
measure ν as ‖f‖ν∞ := inf{C > 0 : |f(x)| ≤ C ν-a.e.}.
Given these operators, we introduce some vector spaces.
The space of all strategy profiles inducing a finite interference
term under CDMA protocol is defined as
L1(M,R, ν) := {p : (p :M → R) & (‖p‖ν1 <∞)}. (6)
According to [23], the vector space
(
L1(M,R, ν), ‖·‖ν1
)
is
a Banach space.
On the other hand, the vector space consisting of all
strategies with bounded power allocation is defined as
L∞(M,R, ν) := {p : (p :M → R) & (‖p‖ν∞ <∞)}. (7)
As explained in Part I [1], the quotient
space (L∞(M,R, ν), ‖·‖ν∞) is a Banach space. And for
ease of presentation, we adopt the convention that two
functions are equivalent if they are equal ν-a.e.
Then, results concerning the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibrium strategy of massive users under CDMA protocol
are restated below.
According to Part I [1], the utility function of the user θi
in the case of CDMA can be expressed as
u(ai, p, θi) = log2 (1 + θi · SINR(p, θi))− βai
= log2
(
1 +
θiai
αE[p(θj)θj ] +N0
)
− βai, θi ∈M.
(8)
Theorem 1 (The equilibrium in CDMA [1]): Assume α 6=
1, there exists a unique mean-field equilibrium p∗ ∈ A ⊂
L1(M,R, ν) when CDMA with single user detection is
adopted in the game G, and the utility function of each player
is given by (8).
Moreover, we also obtain the result on the continuity and
monotonicity of the equilibrium strategy profile under the
CDMA protocol based on the results in parametric optimiza-
tion. Denote the unique mean-field equilibrium of the game G
as p∗ ∈ A when CDMA is adopted.
Corollary 1: The mean-field equilibrium strategy p∗ :
M → E is continuous and monotonically increasing with
respect to the identifier θi ∈M .
Proof: See Appendix I.
Likewise, when NOMA is adopted as the communication
protocol, the utility function of any user θi ∈M is given by
u(ai, p, θi) = log2
(
1 +
θiai
αE[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] +N0
)
− βai.
(9)
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Theorem 2 (The equilibrium in NOMA [1]): Assume α 6=
1, there exists a unique mean-field equilibrium p∗ordered ∈ A ⊂
L∞(M,R, ν) when NOMA is adopted in the game G with
fixed SIC decoding order following the descending order of
the channel gain ‖hi‖2, and the utility function of each player
is given by (9).
Corollary 2: For the game G adopting NOMA, the unique
equilibrium strategy p∗ordered : M → E characterized in Theo-
rem 2 is continuous with respect to θi ∈M .
Proof: See Appendix II.
III. SOCIAL WELFARE COMPARISON BETWEEN CDMA
AND NOMA
Now that the game G under both CDMA and NOMA com-
munication protocol admit a unique mean-field equilibrium,
it is of interest to conduct social welfare comparison when
massive players reach equilibrium under these two protocols
respectively. In this paper, we focus more on qualitative
analysis than quantitative analysis.
In general, the social welfare comparison between mean-
field equilibria of different games is not easily achievable since
it will be difficult to trace the drift of the equilibrium points.
However, in an optimization problem, the change of optimal
value of the objective function under different constraints can
be evaluated based on the Lagrangian dual method [24]. As
motivated by Li et al. [13], where the connection between a
class of mean-field games and optimization problems is estab-
lished, it is desirable to conduct the social welfare comparison
from the perspective of optimization. In a mean-field game
with a large number of players, we define the social welfare
as the average utility achieved by all players.
In this paper, we aim at comparing the effectiveness of
the NOMA communication protocol in 5G network against
the CDMA protocol. As introduced in the previous sec-
tions, the intrinsic difference between NOMA and CDMA
is that whether successive interference cancellation (SIC) is
adopted. The social welfare comparison of the game equilibria
achieved under two different communication protocols can
be formulated as two optimization problems with a common
objective function (i.e., the social welfare metric), several
different constraints (i.e., different communication protocols)
as well as a common constraint reflecting the definition of
a mean-field equilibrium, which restricts the solution set of
each optimization problem to be within the set of mean-field
equilibria. The mathematical details are illustrated below.
First, we define the social welfare metric in terms of
J(p, z) := E[u˜(p(θi), z, θi)] =
∫
θi∈M
u˜(p(θi), z, θi)f(θi)dθi,
(10)
where p ∈ A and z : M → R is ν-measurable, with the
individual utility u˜ corresponding to each player θi defined
as a function of the action p(θi) taken by player θi and the
interference effects z. The expressions of individual utilities u˜,
based on the formulation of the mean-field game, can be
expressed as
u˜(ai, z, θi) := log2
(
1 + θi
ai
αz(θi) +N0
)
− βai. (11)
Remark 1: Whenever the number of users N approaches
infinity, the social welfare can be approximated by the expecta-
tion of individual utilities with respect to the distribution of the
user identity θi ∈M . Hence, the social welfare metric J(p, z)
introduced above can be interpreted as a representation of the
average utility of a large number of users attempting to access
the uplink channel.
Now we consider the following two optimization problems
corresponding to CDMA and NOMA separately. These opti-
mization problems are formulated for comparison rather than
computation.
Problem 1 (CDMA):
max
p∈A, z∈MR(M)
J(p, z)
subject to z(θi) = E[p(θj)θj ],
u˜(p(θi), z, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z, θi),
∀ ai ∈ E , θi ∈M.
(12)
Problem 2 (NOMA):
max
p∈A, z∈MR(M)
J(p, z)
subject to z(θi) = E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}],
u˜(p(θi), z, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z, θi),
∀ ai ∈ E , θi ∈M.
(13)
It can be observed that when the constraints in Problem 1
and Problem 2 are satisfied, the optimal solutions to each
problem is restricted to the set of mean-field equilibria, due
to the equivalence between the constraints and Definition 2.
If we relax the constraints on the interference term z(θi) into
inequalities, the following problems can be obtained.
Problem 3 (CDMA - relaxed):
max
p∈A, z∈MR(M)
J(p, z)
subject to z(θi) ≥ E[p(θj)θj ],
u˜(p(θi), z, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z, θi),
∀ ai ∈ E , θi ∈M.
(14)
Problem 4 (NOMA - relaxed):
max
p∈A, z∈MR(M)
J(p, z)
subject to z(θi) ≥ E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}],
u˜(p(θi), z, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z, θi),
∀ ai ∈ E , θi ∈M.
(15)
Remark 2: We plan to model the non-cooperative interac-
tions among massive channel user under different communi-
cation protocols as the solutions to underlying optimization
problems with different constraints. If we relax the constraints
on the interference term z(θi) as inequalities (i.e., the first con-
straint in (14) and (15) respectively), an inclusion relationship
between the feasible sets of the two problems is introduced,
hence the social welfare comparison can be conducted in a
straightforward manner. It should be noted that the solutions
to the corresponding optimization problems are not affected
by the relaxation in constraints as the objective function will
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“drive” the interference z(θi) to take equality in the constraint,
which is shown in Lemma 1.
For the two optimization problems considered above, the
only difference lies in the constraints on the interference
effects z. Before we compare the equilibrium social welfare of
CDMA and NOMA, we first show some necessary conditions
for optimality of the solutions to Problems 3 and 4.
Lemma 1 (Necessary conditions for optimality): For
any pair of optimal solution (p∗1, z
∗
1) to Problem 3, it is
necessary for it to satisfy z∗1(θi) = E[p∗1(θj)θj ] almost
everywhere for θi ∈M . Similarly, for Problem 4, a necessary
condition for a pair (p∗2, z
∗
2) to be an optimal solution is that
z∗2(θi) = E[p∗2(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] holds almost everywhere for
θi ∈M .
Proof: See Appendix III.
With the necessary conditions for optimality shown above,
we verify the coincidence between optimal solutions to Prob-
lem 3, Problem 4 and the equilibria of the corresponding
mean-field games.
Theorem 3 (Coincidence between optima and equilibria):
Assume α 6= 1, the mean-field equilibria of the game G under
CDMA achieve the optimal value of the objective function
in Problem 3. And the mean-field equilibria of the game G
under NOMA achieve the optimal value of the objective
function in Problem 4.
Proof: In Lemma 1, some necessary conditions for the
optimal solutions to Problem 3 and Problem 4 are presented,
which are required to hold almost everywhere. In this theorem,
we are going to show that any variable pair (p, z) satisfying
Lemma 1 achieves the same value of the objective function as
the mean-field equilibria, i.e., the violation of the conditions
in Lemma 1 on a zero-measure set does not impact the
performance achieved. Hence, it can be verified that the mean-
field equilibria are the optimal solutions to the corresponding
optimization problem. For brevity, the detailed proof is only
presented for the case of NOMA (i.e., Problem 4), and
Problem 3 can follow similar arguments.
It can be obtained from Definition 2 that the pair of decision
variable (p∗, z∗), which corresponds to the unique mean-field
equilibrium p∗ordered proposed by Theorem 2, should satisfy the
following conditions.{
u˜(p∗(θi), z∗, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z∗, θi), ∀ai ∈ E , θi ∈M ;
z∗(θi) = E[p∗(θj)θj1{θj<θi}], ∀θi ∈M.
(16)
Next, we pick an arbitrary pair of feasible decision variables
(p, z) such that the conditions in Lemma 1 are satisfied.
As required by Lemma 1, there exists a subset M0 ⊂ M
with P (M0) = 0, where z(θi) = E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] holds
for any θi ∈ M/M0. Hence, the strict inequality z(θi) >
E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] can only be satisfied at some points θi
in M0.
Fix this pair of feasible variable, we construct its corre-
sponding auxiliary variable pair (p˜, z˜) as follows.
z˜(θi) :=
{
z(θi), θi ∈M/M0;
E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}], Otherwise,
(17)
and
p˜(θi) =
{
p(θi), θi ∈M/M0;
PE
(
1
β ln 2 − αz˜(θi)+N0θi
)
, Otherwise.
(18)
As a result, we can obtain that{
z˜(θi) = E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}], ∀θi ∈M ;
p˜(θi) = PE
(
1
β ln 2 − αz˜(θi)+N0θi
)
, ∀θi ∈M.
(19)
In order to verify that the pair of auxiliary variables
(p˜, z˜) satisfy the necessary condition for optimality derived
in Lemma 1, it suffices to show E[p˜(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] =
E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}].
We derive that
E[p˜(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] =
∫
θj∈M∩(0,θi]
p˜(θj)θjf(θj)dθj
= 0 +
∫
θj∈(M/M0)∩(0,θi]
p(θj)θjf(θj)dθj
= E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}],
where the second equality holds due to the fact that the set
M0 has Lebesgue measure zero, i.e., P (M0) = 0.
As a result, the pair of auxiliary variables (p˜, z˜) satisfy{
u˜(p˜(θi), z˜, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z˜, θi), ∀ai ∈ E , θi ∈M ;
z˜(θi) = E[p˜(θj)θj1{θj<θi}], ∀θi ∈M.
(20)
Since these conditions correspond to the definition of mean-
field equilibrium of the game G when NOMA is adopted, and
the mean-field equilibrium strategy for NOMA exists and is
unique according to Theorem 2. Hence, we can obtain that
(p˜, z˜) = (p∗, z∗).
Now, since P (M0) = 0, we analyze the value of the
objective function achieved, as follows.
J(p, z) =
∫
θi∈M
u˜(p(θi), z, θi)f(θi)dθi
= 0 +
∫
θi∈M/M0
u˜(p(θi), z, θi)f(θi)dθi
= 0 +
∫
θi∈M/M0
u˜(p˜(θi), z˜, θi)f(θi)dθi
= J(p˜, z˜) = J(p∗, z∗).
Therefore, the arbitrarily chosen feasible strategy (p, z) sat-
isfying the necessary condition of optimality achieves exactly
the same value of the objective function J(p, z) as the mean-
field equilibrium p∗ordered. Then, it can be concluded that the
mean-field equilibrium p∗ordered achieves the optimal value of
the objective function J(p, z) in the optimization problem. The
proof is finished.
Remark 3: Based on Theorem 3, the social welfare compar-
ison between different equilibrium points becomes tractable
from the optimization perspective. Following the trend of
performance evaluation involving NOMA, we aim at extending
the existing literature [18]–[21] illustrating the superiority of
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NOMA over OMA to a non-cooperative setup. Though fixed
decoding order and perfect interference cancellation have been
assumed in Part I [1], as long as the existence of mean-field
equilibrium holds, Theorem 3 together with the social welfare
comparison in Theorem 4 as follows is expected to hold for
more general formulations without these assumptions.
The main result on the social welfare comparison between
CDMA and NOMA is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (NOMA outperforms CDMA under equilibria):
When 0 < α < 1, in terms of the social welfare, i.e., the
expected utility u achieved by the population of uplink users,
the social welfare achieved at the mean-field equilibrium
of the game G adopting NOMA is at least as good as the
equilibrium social welfare of the game adopting CDMA.
Proof: Based on Theorem 3, since both Problem 3
and Problem 4 are feasible, and the optimal values of their
objective functions can be attained within the feasible sets,
their optimal values can be alternatively expressed in the
following form.
We denote the feasible set of Problem 3 and Problem 4
as C1 and C2 respectively, and their corresponding optimal
values as J∗1 , J
∗
2 ∈ R. Since E[p(θj)θj ] ≥ E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}],
we obtain that C1 ⊂ C2. As the optimal value of these two
problems can be expressed by J∗1 := sup
(p,z)∈C1
J(p, z) and
J∗2 := sup
(p,z)∈C2
J(p, z). We conclude that J∗1 ≤ J∗2 . This
indicates that in terms of the expected utility achieved under
equilibrium strategy, NOMA will perform at least as good as
CDMA.
IV. INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIORS AT THE EQUILIBRIUM
The collective behaviors comparison among the population
of users has been conducted in the previous section. It is
of interest to characterize some individual behaviors at the
equilibrium.
We present below the cutoff property of the equilibrium
strategy for both CDMA and NOMA. According to Theorem 1
and Theorem 2, denote the unique equilibrium strategy for
CDMA as p∗ ∈ A and the equilibrium strategy for NOMA as
p∗ordered ∈ A.
Proposition 1 (Transmission cutoff): Assume Emin = 0,
i.e., it is feasible for a user to turn off its antenna and
choose not to transmit. Then, there exist cutoff thresholds 0 <
θNOMAth < θ
CDMA
th such that under equilibrium strategies of
CDMA and NOMA, users with identity below the thresholds
will choose not to transmit, i.e., p∗(θi) = 0 for any θi ≤
θCDMAth and p
∗
ordered(θi) = 0 for any θi ≤ θNOMAth .
Proof: We start from the case of CDMA, the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategy p∗ ∈ A is given
in Theorem 1. For an arbitrary user identity θi ∈M , its trans-
mission power control action under the equilibrium strategy
p∗ is obtained from the best response operator (4), which can
be explicitly expressed as
p∗(θi) = PE
(
1
β ln 2
− αE[p
∗(θj)θj ] +N0
θi
)
. (21)
Through solving the function p∗(θi) = 0, it can be obtained
that p∗(θi) = 0 if θi ≤ β ln 2{αE[p∗(θj)θj ] + N0}. Hence,
though a closed-form of p∗(θj) is not available, the cutoff
threshold for the user identity under CDMA protocol can be
expressed as θCDMAth := β ln 2{αE[p∗(θj)θj ] +N0} > 0.
On the other hand, we consider the case when NOMA with
fixed decoding order is adopted. It is known from the problem
formulation that the decoding order follows the descending
order of user identity θi = ‖hi‖2.
The definition of the cutoff threshold θNOMAth under NOMA
requires p∗ordered(θi) = 0 for any users θi ≤ θNOMAth . Hence,
the interference faced by the users with identity θNOMAth
should be E[p∗ordered(θi)θj1{θj<θi}] = 0. As a result, it can be
obtained from the definition of the best response operator (4)
that θNOMAth satisfies
0 = p∗ordered(θ
NOMA
th )
= PE
(
1
β ln 2
−
αE[p∗ordered(θj)θj1{θj<θNOMAth }] +N0
θNOMAth
)
= PE
(
1
β ln 2
− N0
θNOMAth
)
.
Then, the cutoff threshold for NOMA is θNOMAth =
N0β ln 2 > 0, and we have θNOMAth = N0β ln 2 <
β ln 2{αE[p∗(θj)θj ] +N0} = θCDMAth .
The cutoff property in the equilibrium power allocation
strategy indicates that uplink users with sufficiently small
channel gain will choose not to transmit. Next, for an un-
bounded set M of user identities, we obtain an additional
property such that for users with sufficiently large uplink
channel gains, their equilibrium transmission power under
CDMA and NOMA can be arbitrarily close.
Proposition 2 (Convergence behavior for high-gain users):
Assume the player set M is unbounded above, i.e.,
∀L > 0, ∃θi ∈M s.t. θi > L. Then
lim
θi→∞
|p∗(θi)− p∗ordered(θi)| = 0. (22)
Proof: By definition of the equilibrium strategies p∗
and p∗ordered, we obtain the following inequality based on the
best response operator (4). For any θi ∈M ,
|p∗(θi)− p∗ordered(θi)|
=
α
θi
∣∣E[p∗(θj)θj ]− E[p∗ordered(θj)θj1{θj<θi}]∣∣
≤ α
θi
{|E[p∗(θj)θj ]|+ |E[p∗ordered(θj)θj ]|} ≤
2α
θi
EmaxE[‖h‖2].
For any  > 0, we choose θ >
2αEmaxE[‖h‖2]
 . Then we
obtain that |p∗(θi)− p∗ordered(θi)| <  for any θ > θ, which
completes the proof.
More importantly, it can be obtained that the curve of equi-
librium power allocation for different users under CDMA and
NOMA will have a crossing, hence the curve of equilibrium
data rate achieved under CDMA and NOMA also crosses. In
other words, pointwise improvement in the equilibrium data
rate for different types of users is not achievable through
adopting NOMA instead of CDMA. Intuitively, there is “no
free lunch” in employing NOMA to improve the overall
system performance.
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Proposition 3 (Infeasibility of pointwise improvement):
Assume Emin = 0, it can be obtained that the curve of
equilibrium power strategy p∗ of CDMA will cross p∗ordered of
NOMA. Consequently, it is infeasible to achieve pointwise
improvement in the equilibrium data rate achieved by NOMA
in comparison with CDMA.
Proof: First, we show that the curve of p∗ crosses p∗ordered,
which we will prove by contradiction.
Assume that the curve of p∗ and p∗ordered never crosses.
According to Proposition 1, the cutoff thresholds satisfies 0 <
θNOMAth < θ
CDMA
th , hence the nonexistence of crossing can be
expressed as p∗(θi) ≤ p∗ordered(θi) for any θi ∈M . According
to (21) and a similar condition for NOMA
p∗ordered(θi) = PE
(
1
β ln 2
− αE[p
∗
ordered(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] +N0
θi
)
,
(23)
it can be obtained that p∗(θi) ≤ p∗ordered(θi) im-
plies E[p∗(θj)θj ] ≥ E[p∗ordered(θj)θj1{θj<θi}], which holds for
any θi ∈ M . By taking a sufficiently large θi ∈ M , we can
conclude that E[p∗(θj)θj ] ≥ E[p∗ordered(θj)θj ].
On the other hand, since p∗(θi) ≤ p∗ordered(θi),
there is E[p∗(θj)θj ] ≤ E[p∗ordered(θj)θj ]. Thus we
have E[p∗(θj)θj ] = E[p∗ordered(θj)θj ] as the inequality
holds for both directions.
Given p∗(θi) ≤ p∗ordered(θi), this is equivalent to say that
E[|p∗ordered(θj)− p∗(θj)|θj ]
= E[p∗ordered(θj)θj ]− E[p∗(θj)θj ] = 0.
The expression above can be equivalently interpreted as
0 = E[|p∗ordered(θj)− p∗(θj)|θj ]
=
∫
θj∈M
|p∗ordered(θj)− p∗(θj)|dν(θj),
i.e., p∗ = p∗ordered, ν-a.e, where ν is defined in (1).
Again, we recall the cutoff property in Proposition 1, which
indicates that the cutoff thresholds 0 < θNOMAth < θ
CDMA
th are
strictly different for p∗ and p∗ordered. As both the function p
∗ :
M → E and p∗ordered : M → E are shown to be continuous
with respect to θi ∈ M in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, it is
impossible to have p∗ = p∗ordered, ν-a.e.
Therefore, contradiction emerges, which verifies that the
power allocation strategies p∗ crosses p∗ordered.
Secondly, we show that pointwise improvement in the
curve of equilibrium data rate achieved for different users is
impossible.
Denote the type variable at which p∗ crosses p∗ordered
as θcross ∈ M . The crossing behaviors cannot happen at
saturation region, i.e., Emin or Emax. According to (21)
and (23) as well as the continuity of p∗(θi) and p∗ordered(θi)
with respect to θi ∈M , there exists a sufficiently small δ > 0
such that for any |θ − θcross| < δ, we have
p∗(θ) =
1
β ln 2
− αE[p
∗(θj)θj ] +N0
θ
and
p∗ordered(θ) =
1
β ln 2
− αE[p
∗
ordered(θj)θj1{θj<θ}] +N0
θ
.
We denote the equilibrium data achieved by CDMA
and NOMA at user type θi ∈ M as d∗CDMA(θi) =
log2
(
1 + θi
p∗(θi)
αE[p∗(θj)θj ]+N0
)
and d∗NOMA(θi) =
log2
(
1 + θi
p∗(θi)
αE[p∗ordered(θj)θj1{θj<θi}]+N0
)
separately. Then,
based on the conditions on θcross above, it can be obtained
that for any |θ − θcross| < δ,
d∗CDMA(θ) = log2
(
1
1− β ln 2 p∗(θ)
)
(24)
and
d∗NOMA(θ) = log2
(
1
1− β ln 2 p∗ordered(θ)
)
. (25)
The function d∗CDMA(θ) and d
∗
NOMA(θ) have the same
monotonicity properties with respect to θ ∈ M as p∗(θ)
and p∗ordered(θ) respectively when |θ − θcross| < δ. Therefore,
the curve of equilibrium data achieved for different users under
CDMA crosses that under NOMA, i.e., pointwise improve-
ment in the equilibrium data rate is infeasible through adopting
NOMA instead of CDMA.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we numerically illustrate the results concern-
ing the properties of the equilibrium strategy profile under both
CDMA (with fierce competition) and NOMA (as a natural fair
principle). The simulation results as follows will be presented
with the purpose to demonstrate the capability for NOMA to
enhance the social welfare and fairness among heterogeneous
users.
First, we introduce some parameters and setups adopted
in the simulation. We consider that the channel gain hi
for each user follows Rayleigh fading. Specifically, for an
arbitrary user, the probability density function for the squared
magnitude of its channel gain θi = ‖hi‖2 is expressed as
f(θi) =
{
1
σ exp
(− θiσ2 ), θi ≥ 0;
0, Otherwise.
(26)
During simulation, we adopt the parameter σ = 5, the
probability density function is shown in the figure below.
Fig. 1: The probability density function (PDF) of the squared
magnitude of channel gain θi = ‖hi‖2.
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It is intractable to evaluate the behaviors of an infinite
number of players for a numerical simulation, nor is it of
interest in practice. Hence, the results we present below are
generated with N = 1000 players. The white noise process
w[k] in the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel
features a power spectrum density N0 = 5, and the spread
spectrum parameter α = Nns = 0.1 applies to both the case
of CDMA and NOMA. In the MFG, we assume the set of
feasible power levels is E = [0, 150].
Now, we calculate the equilibrium power allocation strategy
of the game G as well as the corresponding data rates when
CDMA and NOMA are adopted respectively, as shown in
Fig. 2.
The equilibrium power allocation strategy is analysed first.
It is noticed that the gap between the equilibrium strategy
of CDMA and NOMA decreases as the value of the tradeoff
parameter β > 0 increase. An intuitive interpretation is that the
tradeoff parameter β, which determines the cost of unit power
consumption, will have a stronger regulating power when it
takes a larger value because it results in a more conservative
strategy for each user. Thus, through increasing the value of β,
fierce competitions in CDMA (i.e., high transmission power
always results in a high data rate) can be relieved to a certain
extent. Hence, the equilibrium power allocation under CDMA
will gradually approach a natural fairness introduced through
NOMA (i.e., signals from users with high channel gains or
receiving gains benefit from their superiority of magnitude at
the receiver, while others benefit from successive interference
cancellation) as β increases. Besides, it is noticeable that the
power consumption is significantly reduced with increase in
the value of β, for which an intuitive interpretation is the
decrease of demand as unit price rises. The design problem of
pricing in resource allocation has been investigated in [25]–
[27].
The improvement in user fairness achieved by NOMA
can be observed from the curves of achieved data rate in
Fig. 2. With the same tradeoff parameter β > 0 in the utility
functions, NOMA features a more balanced level of achieved
data rates than CDMA, especially for users with a smaller
channel gain. Similar to the analysis of equilibrium power
allocation strategy, for the achieved data rate of different
sensors, increasing the value of β will also eliminate the
gap between the curve of data rate achieved under CDMA
and NOMA. However, as indicated by Fig. 2, the increase
in β is undesirable for NOMA such that the improvement of
user fairness vanishes. Aside from that, the level of data rates
achieved in general, though slightly decreased with a larger β,
does not vary much.
With these observations, some empirical statements con-
cerning the applicability of CDMA and NOMA can be made:
(1) For the cases with a small cost for power consumption
(i.e., β > 0 takes a small value), NOMA is suitable for
its advantages in the fairness achieved;
(2) For the case of costly power resources (i.e., β > 0
takes a large value), the performance gap between CDMA
and NOMA is ignorable, thus CDMA excels for its
convenience of implementation.
In the following, we focus on some properties theoretically
shown in the main results. It is of interest to provide some
numerical verification to them, which is helpful in obtaining
intuitive understandings. In Fig. 2, the properties established
in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 concerning the continuity
and monotonicity of the equilibrium strategies can already be
observed.
The comparison between equilibrium social welfare under
CDMA and NOMA, as analysed in Theorem 4, constitutes
a key portion of the main results in this paper. Thus, we
numerically evaluate the expected utility of all participants,
i.e., the objective function J(p∗, z∗) = E[u(p∗(θi), p∗, θi)]
defined in (10). This metric of social welfare corresponds to
the average level of tradeoff between the data rate and the
energy cost among a large number of non-cooperative uplink
users.
The expected utilities under game equilibrium are evaluated
for different β > 0. Moreover, the curve achieved with
CDMA and NOMA are contrasted with each other for visu-
ally illustrating the effectiveness of NOMA in social welfare
enhancement, as shown in Fig. 3.
It is observed from Fig. 3 that NOMA can indeed achieve
a social welfare which is no worse than CDMA, hence is
in accordance with the theoretical results in Theorem 4. In
addition, we observe that when the value of β > 0 is
small, more effective performance improvement is achieved
by NOMA, which coincides with our intuitive analysis above.
When β > 0 takes a large value, the regulating effects of the
energy cost dominates, thus the benefits of implementing the
NOMA protocol gradually shrinks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have considered an uplink power control
problem for wireless communication when massive users are
competing for the channel resources. Both power-domain
NOMA and CDMA are investigated, on which the non-
cooperative channel access model is based. When analyzing
the equilibrium behaviors of this non-cooperative channel
access problem, a mean-field game (MFG) model is adopted to
relieve the computation burden. The existence and uniqueness
of an equilibrium strategy are established for CDMA and
NOMA respectively in Part I [1]. In this part, based on the
previous results, performance evaluation has been conducted
under the equilibrium strategies. A comparison of the equilib-
rium social welfare indicates that NOMA achieves a tradeoff
between the throughput and power consumption which is at
least as good as CDMA. Intuitively, since CDMA features
fierce contest, it does not promote efficiency. The power-
domain NOMA, on the other hand, can drive the interplay
among users to follow a natural fair principle. Results are
verified with numerical simulations. In future works, a more
general form of utility functions can be considered.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof: Since the existence and uniqueness of mean-
field equilibrium in the game G adopting CDMA protocol
have already been shown in Theorem 1, by the definition
AUTHOR et al.: PREPARATION OF PAPERS FOR IEEE TRANSACTIONS AND JOURNALS (FEBRUARY 2019) 9
Fig. 2: The equilibrium power control strategy and data rate achieved for different values of the tradeoff parameter β.
Fig. 3: The expected utility J(p∗, z∗) achieved under equilib-
rium strategies with CDMA and NOMA separately.
of a mean-field equilibrium, we can express the equilibrium
strategy profile p∗ as a best response, i.e.,
p∗(θi) ∈ BR(θi, p∗) = argmax
ai∈E
u(ai, p
∗, θi)
= argmax
ai∈E
log2
(
1 +
θiai
αE[p∗(θj)θj ] +N0
)
− βai.
When the opponents’ strategy is fixed to the equilibrium
strategy p∗ ∈ A, it turns out that the utility u(ai, p∗, θi)
is a strictly concave function defined on E × M . Hence,
the best response of player θi is a singleton, i.e., BR(θi, p)
takes a unique value for each θi ∈ M under a fixed p.
According to Theorem 9.17 in [28], for a strictly concave
continuous function u(ai, p, θi) under any fixed p, the single-
valued maximizer BR(θi, p) is a continuous function with
respect to the parameter θi. Due to the existence and unique-
ness of the mean-field equilibrium strategy profile p∗, the
function p∗(θi) ∈ BR(θi, p∗), as a best response to itself,
is a continuous function.
Next, we proceed to show that the equilibrium strategy
profile p∗ : M → E is monotonically increasing with respect
to θi ∈ M . Beforehand, it is necessary to show that the
utility function u(ai, p, θi), for any fixed p, satisfies strictly
increasing difference in (ai, θi). In other words, we need to
verify that
u(a+i , p, θ
+
i )− u(a−i , p, θ+i ) > u(a+i , p, θ−i )− u(a−i , p, θ−i )
(27)
for any a+i > a
−
i and θ
+
i > θ
−
i given a fixed p.
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From the expression of the utility function u, we obtain
u(a+i , p, θ)− u(a−i , p, θ)
= log2
(
1 +
a+i − a−i
αE[p∗(θj)θj ]+N0
θ + a
−
i
)
− β(a+i − a−i ).
Thus, it is obvious that u(a+i , p, θ)− u(a−i , p, θ) is monoton-
ically increasing with respect to θ for any given a+i > a
−
i ,
which leads to (27). Besides, for any fixed p and θi, the utility
function u is a continuous function defined on a compact
interval E = [umin, umax]. According to the extreme value
theorem, the utility u must attain its maximum within E for any
given p and θi. Therefore, according to Theorem 10.6 in [28],
the mean-field equilibrium strategy p∗, as the optimal action
for maximizing u(ai, p∗, θi), is monotonically increasing with
respect to the identifier θi ∈M .
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Proof: By definition, the equilibrium strategy p∗ordered is
the best response to itself given the utility function u(ai, p, θi)
for NOMA. In Theorem 2, we have already established the
existence and uniqueness of p∗ordered :M → E . Then, we have
p∗ordered(θi) ∈ BRordered(θi, p∗ordered)
=: argmax
ai∈E
u(ai, p
∗
ordered, θi)
is a singleton for each given θi ∈M .
By Theorem 9.17 in [28], the best response
BRordered(θi, p∗ordered) is a upper semi-continuous
correspondence on M . As BRordered(θi, p∗ordered) is a
singleton for any θi ∈ M , it can be concluded that
p∗ordered(θi) ∈ BRordered(θi, p∗ordered) is continuous with respect
to θi ∈M .
APPENDIX III
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: We first consider the feasibility of Problem 3
and of Problem 4, i.e., to show that in either the case of
CDMA and NOMA, there exists at least one pair of variables
(p, z) such that all the constraints in the optimization problem
are satisfied. This can be shown in a straightforward way
through the existence of mean-field equilibrium as indicated in
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Here, we use the case of NOMA
for explanation. According to Theorem 2, there exists a unique
mean-field equilibrium strategy p∗ordered ∈ A for the game G
when NOMA is adopted. Based on the definition of mean-field
equilibrium, we can obtain that for any ai ∈ E , θi ∈M ,
u(p∗ordered(θi), p
∗
ordered, θi) ≥ u(ai, p∗ordered, θi). (28)
It is equivalent to
u˜(p∗ordered(θi), z
∗, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z∗, θi), ∀ ai ∈ E , θi ∈M,
(29)
where the interference term z∗(θi) is assigned the value
z∗(θi) = E[p∗ordered(θj)θj1{θj<θi}]. Thus, it is evident that the
pair (p∗ordered, z
∗) satisfies the constraints in Problem 4, i.e.,
Problem 4 is feasible. Following the same procedures with the
help of Theorem 1, Problem 3 can be shown to be feasible as
well.
Now, we propose some necessary conditions for the opti-
mality of solutions to these two optimization problems. Thus
the feasible set of variables where optimal solutions reside
can be further truncated. Still, we restrict our arguments to
the NOMA case for explanation.
To begin with, we focus on the constraint z(θi) ≥
E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}]. We aim at showing that any pairs of
optimal solution (p∗, z∗) to Problem 4 satisfies z∗(θi) =
E[p∗(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] a.e. in M .
We pick a pair of decision variables (p, z) satisfy-
ing u˜(p(θi), z, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z, θi), ∀θi ∈ M and there exists
a bounded set M2 ⊂ M satisfying P (M2) > 0 and for any
θi ∈M2, there is z(θi) > E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}]. Assume (p, z)
is an optimal solution to Problem 4.
Define a measurable function  : M2 → R such that
(θi) := z(θi)−E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] > 0. Since the space M ⊂
R is a metric space, according to Lemma 4.1 (Lusin’s theorem)
in Chapter II of [29], for 2 := 12P (M2) > 0, there exists a
closed set M2 ⊂ M2 such that ν(M2\M2) ≤ 2 and the
restriction of the measurable function  on the set M2, which
is denoted as M2 : M2 → R, is continuous. Since M2
is bounded, the closed set M2 ⊂ M2 is compact. Hence,
based on Weierstrass extreme value theorem [30], there exists
a θ′ ∈M2 such that inf
θi∈M2
M2(θi) = M2(θ
′) = (θ′) > 0.
Then, we construct a new variable z˜ such that
z˜(θi) :=
{
z(θi)− 1K (θi), θi ∈M2;
z(θi), Otherwise,
where K > 1 is a scaling factor.
In order for the constructed variable z˜ to satisfy the con-
straint u˜(p(θi), z, θi) ≥ u˜(ai, z, θi), ∀θi ∈ M , we obtain
an updated version of the optimal power control variable p˜
in response to the change in the interference term from z
to z˜. Since the individual utility function u˜(ai, z, θi) in the
optimization problem is strictly concave with respect to the
variable ai, it has a unique maximizer in terms of ai when
other variables are fixed. Then, the updated version of the
optimal power control strategy p˜(θi) is expressed as
p˜(θi) := argmax
ai∈E
u˜(ai, z˜, θi) (30)
= PE
(
1
β ln 2
− αz˜(θi) +N0
θi
)
=
{
PE
(
1
β ln 2 −
α[z(θi)− 1K (θi)]+N0
θi
)
, θi ∈M2;
p(θi), Otherwise.
It remains to verify the existence of a scaling factor K >
1 such that the pair (p˜, z˜) satisfies the constraint z(θi) ≥
E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] for any θi ∈M . By definition of (p˜, z˜), it
suffices to show that z˜(θi) ≥ E[p˜(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] for any θi ∈
M2.
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According to the derivations in (30), for any θi ∈M ,
|p(θi)− p˜(θi)|
=
∣∣∣∣argmax
ai∈E
u˜(ai, z, θi)− argmax
ai∈E
u˜(ai, z˜, θi)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣α[z(θi)− z˜(θi)]θi
∣∣∣∣ ≤ α(θi)Kθi .
Hence for any θi ∈M ,∣∣E[(p(θj)− p˜(θj))θj1{θj<θi}]∣∣
≤ E[|p(θj)− p˜(θj)|θj ] = α
K
E[(θj)].
As (θi) > 0 for any θi ∈ M2 and 0 ≤ E[(θj)] < ∞ is a
constant, there exists a sufficiently large K such that
z˜(θi)− E[p˜(θj)θj1{θj<θi}]
= z(θi)− 1
K
(θi)− E[p(θj)θj1{θj<θi}]+
E[(p(θj)− p˜(θj))θj1{θj<θi}]
≥ K − 1
K
(θi)−
∣∣E[(p(θj)− p˜(θj))θj1{θj<θi}]∣∣
≥ K − 1
K
M2(θ
′)− α
K
E[(θj)] > 0, ∀θi ∈M2,
where the last inequality holds due to (θi) = M2(θi) ≥
inf
θi∈M2
M2(θi) = M2(θ
′) for any θi ∈ M2 and by a fixed
choice of K > αE[(θj)](θ′) + 1 ≥ 1. Thus, the feasibility of the
constructed variable pair (p˜, z˜) is successfully shown.
Now, since z˜(θi) < z(θi) by definition, we can obtain the
following inequalities
u˜(p(θi), z, θi) = log2
(
1 + θi
p(θi)
αz(θi) +N0
)
− βp(θi)
< log2
(
1 + θi
p(θi)
αz˜(θi) +N0
)
− βp(θi)
≤ log2
(
1 + θi
p˜(θi)
αz˜(θi) +N0
)
− βp˜(θi)
= u˜(p˜(θi), z˜, θi), ∀θi ∈M2,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that ai = p˜(θi) is
a maximizer of u˜(ai, z˜, θi).
Therefore, the social welfare under the new decision vari-
able satisfies
J(p˜, z˜) =
∫
θi∈M
u˜(p˜(θi), z˜, θi)f(θi)dθi >∫
θi∈M2
u˜(p(θi), z, θi)f(θi)dθi +
∫
θi∈M/M2
u˜(p˜(θi), z˜, θi)f(θi)dθi
=
∫
θi∈M2
u˜(p(θi), z, θi)f(θi)dθi+∫
θi∈M/M2
u˜(p(θi), z, θi)f(θi)dθi = J(p, z),
which indicates that it is not possible for the original pair of
decision variables (p, z) to be optimal.
Therefore, z∗(θi) = E[p∗(θj)θj1{θj<θi}] holds almost ev-
erywhere in M is a necessary condition for an optimal solution
to Problem 4.
In light of the proof above, the same arguments can be
applied to Problem 3 and a necessary condition for optimality
can be obtained that z∗(θi) = E[p∗(θj)θj ] holds almost
everywhere in M . Thus the proof is finished.
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